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NOTE
STIGMATIZED SLENCE: THE EXCLUSION OF
HIV AND AIDS SUFFERERS FROM THE
"OBAMACARE" LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Ashley N. Southerland*
The continued presence and growing rates of individuals infected
with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immu-
nodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) in the United States has come to reflect
an epidemic of significant proportion. Unfortunately, federal legislation
has been eerily silent regarding the establishment of protections against
health status-based discrimination for asymptomatic HIV and AIDS suf-
ferers. Congress has done little to change this reality, despite the institu-
tion of major healthcare system and insurance reform by the Obama
Administration in 2010. This Note argues that "Obamacare" and the
two laws that define it-the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010-fail to
address asymptomatic HIV and AIDS infection as a significant source of
health status-based insurance discrimination. As a result, these individ-
uals continue to be ignored, subject to the ambiguities of "disability"-
based legislation, and relegated to the status of a legally invisible class.
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INTRODUCTION
American citizens infected with human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)' hold a tenu-
ous place among the substantively ambiguous concentric circles of the
1 See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 633-37 (1998) (discussing the "pre-
dictable and . . . unalterable course" of HIV infection). Justice Kennedy, for the majority,
outlined the physiological character of HIV:
Once a person is infected with HIV, the virus invades different cells in the
blood and in body tissues. Certain white blood cells, known as helper T-lympho-
cytes or CD4+ cells, are particularly vulnerable to HIV. The virus attaches to the
CD4 receptor site of the target cell and fuses its membrane to the cell's membrane.
HIV is a retrovirus, which means it uses an enzyme to convert its own genetic mate-
rial into a form indistinguishable from the genetic material of the target cell. The
virus' genetic material migrates to the cell's nucleus and becomes integrated with the
cell's chromosomes. Once integrated, the virus can use the cell's own genetic ma-
chinery to replicate itself. Additional copies of the virus are released into the body
and infect other cells in turn. Although the body does produce antibodies to combat
HIV infection, the antibodies are not effective in eliminating the virus.
The virus eventually kills the infected host cell. CD4+ cells play a critical role
in coordinating the body's immune response system, and the decline in their number
causes corresponding deterioration of the body's ability to fight infections from
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healthcare system, insurance regimes, and the law. Literally and legally,
these individuals-despite being engulfed in an epidemiological, and
often losing, battle for their lives-have shaky ground, at best, upon
which to demand protections under the law throughout the stages of their
disease. 2 Unfortunately for them, the economic rationales for health sta-
tus-based insurance discrimination and the legislative silence on protec-
tion under the Americans with Disabilities Act have resulted in a legal
"donut hole," leaving many asymptomatic3 HIV and AIDS sufferers lost
in the legal fray, further stigmatized and uninsured with mounting medi-
cal costs and little foreseeable economic relief.
However, now that the Obama Administration has instituted major
health care reform, both the health care system and the insurance cover-
age regime will receive a significant overhaul. This Note argues that,
while "Obamacare" reform is no doubt one of the most significant pieces
of social legislation of this era, the two laws that define it-the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act4 (PPACA) and the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA)5- are riddled with the
same substantive ambiguities that plagued their statutory predecessors,
many sources. Tracking the infected individual's CD4+ cell count is one of the most
accurate measures of the course of the disease.
Id. at 633-34.
2 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 635 (chronicling the stages of HIV: "The initial stage of
HIV infection is known as acute or primary HIV infection. In a typical case, this stage lasts
three months. The virus concentrates in the blood. The assault on the immune system is
immediate. The victim suffers from a sudden and serious decline in the number of white blood
cells. There is no latency period. Mononucleosis-like symptoms often emerge between six
days and six weeks after infection, at times accompanied by fever, headache, enlargement of
the lymph nodes (lymphadenopathy), muscle pain (myalgia), rash, lethargy, gastrointestinal
disorders, and neurological disorders. Usually these symptoms abate within 14 to 21 days.
HIV antibodies appear in the bloodstream within 3 weeks; circulating HIV can be detected
within 10 weeks.").
3 See id. at 635-36 (defining the asymptomatic phase as follows: "After the symptoms
associated with the initial stage subside, the disease enters what is referred to sometimes as its
asymptomatic phase. The term is a misnomer, in some respects, for clinical features persist
throughout, including lymphadenopathy, dermatological disorders, oral lesions, and bacterial
infections. Although it varies with each individual, in most instances this stage lasts for 7 to
11 years. The virus now tends to concentrate in the lymph nodes, though low levels of the
virus continue to appear in the blood. It was once thought that the virus became inactive
during this period, but it is now known that the relative lack of symptoms is attributable to the
virus' migration from the circulatory system into the lymph nodes. The migration reduces the
viral presence in other parts of the body, with a corresponding diminution in physical manifes-
tations of the disease. The virus, however, thrives in the lymph nodes, which, as a vital point
of the body's immune response system, represents an ideal environment for the infection of
other CD4+ cells... . A person is regarded as having AIDS when his or her CD4+ count drops
below 200 cells/mm3 of blood or when CD4+ cells comprise less than 14% of his or her total
lymphocytes.").
4 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified in scattered provisions
throughout the U.S.C.).
5 Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
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and ultimately leave asymptomatic AIDS and HIV sufferers unprotected
from health status-based discrimination.
Part I of this Note examines the historical lineage of the legal duty
to treat, tracing that duty from its common law origins to its modem
statutory foundations in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and up to the
more recent Americans with Disabilities Act, passed in 1990. This Part
also addresses the most recent Supreme Court case, Bragdon v. Abbott,6
which directly addresses the ability of healthcare providers to discrimi-
nate against HIV-positive individuals in the non-emergency medical care
context. Part II provides an overview of the modem American insurance
regime, particularly with regard to individuals that the insurance industry
commonly perceives as "high risk"-including those with HIV and
AIDS. This Part also outlines the federal regulations currently in place
to help combat insurance discrimination based on health status. Part III
gives a general overview of the pertinent parts of both PPACA and
HCERA as they relate to insurance coverage. Finally, the Note con-
cludes by examining whether "Obamacare" might very well bring health
status-based discrimination protection to this legally "homeless" class.
I. HISTORICAL DUTIES TO TREAT
A. Common Law Duties
At common law, contract theory governed the physician-patient re-
lationship. As such, the general rule was that healthcare providers had
no duty to treat a patient without the existence of a prior agreement or
statutory regulation.7 Essentially, "[u]ntil both parties manifest[ed] ei-
ther an express or implied intent to create a contractual relationship, the
physician [had] no duty to treat the patient."8
However, exceptions did and still do exist. If an individual relies on
a healthcare provider's gratuitous undertaking to provide care, the pro-
vider's affirmative step implicitly imposes a duty on the physician to
treat the relying individual.9 Healthcare providers-often those located
in hospitals with emergency facilities-are also required to treat individ-
uals who require emergency care.10 However, the healthcare provider's
duty to treat only lasts for the duration of the individual's emergency;
once the emergency ends, the duty to treat disappears. 1 In addition,
while healthcare providers are allowed to take "reasonable precautions to
6 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
7 Jill Cohen, Access to Medical Care for HIV-Infected Individuals Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act: A Duty to Treat, 18 Am. J.L. & MED. 233, 235 (1992).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 236.
10 Id.
11 Id.
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protect themselves during emergencies," blanket refusals to treat individ-
uals do not fall under such precautionary headings. 1 2
Hospitals and physicians who initiate patient care also have a duty
to complete treatment; once again, such initiation effectively and implic-
itly establishes a contractual relationship between the two parties.13 Phy-
sicians can only terminate these contractual relationships if one of four
situations arises: (1) the patient dismisses the physician; (2) the patient
and physician mutually consent to terminate the relationship; (3) the pa-
tient no longer needs the physician's services; or (4) the physician with-
draws his services and instead provides a suitable medical alternative. 14
All of these common law rules apply to those who have HIV and
AIDS. 15
B. Statutory Duty to Treat
Today, statutory provisions and administrative regulations have re-
placed much of the common law regime, and more accurately reflect the
current mandate surrounding the duty to treat. Before Congress enacted
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 197316 stood to protect "disabled" individuals
against discrimination.
1. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Under the relevant part of the statute, "[n]o otherwise qualified indi-
vidual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."1 7 To bring a complaint under the Rehabilitation
Act, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) that the plaintiff fell within
the Act's definition of an "individual with a disability"; (2) that the plain-
tiff was "otherwise qualified" to benefit from the program or service
from which the exclusion occurred; (3) that the plaintiffs disability was
the sole reason for his or her exclusion; and (4) that Section 504 applied
to the program or service that excluded the plaintiff.' The Act defines
as disabled "any person who (1) has a physical or mental impairment
which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activi-
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 237.
15 Id.
16 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2002).
17 Id. § 794(a).
18 Cohen, supra note 7, at 237.
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ties; (2) has a record of such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having
such impairment."19
Courts use a case-by-case analysis to determine whether a plaintiff
is disabled; under this analysis, "neither HIV infection nor the existence
of full-blown AIDS automatically qualifies an individual as disabled."20
However, after proceeding through the three-point inquiry described
above, many courts have found that HIV and AIDS infection does indeed
qualify as a disability.21 Expectedly, courts' analyses tend to be highly
fact-specific, and thus their holdings do not establish a per se disability
rule regarding HIV and AIDS-infected persons. 22 Because such analyses
do not identify these individuals as "disabled" in the aggregate, asymp-
tomatic HIV and AIDS sufferers lack any guaranteed protections under
the statute.
2. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
This Act, passed by Congress in 1990, is the most recent piece of
federal legislation that attempts to fill the gap and provide protection to
asymptomatic HIV and AIDS sufferers under the definition of a disabil-
ity. 2 3 The statute mandates that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation." 24
Unfortunately, attempting to construe the statute's definition of
"disability" to include HIV and AIDS sufferers still presents a problem.
The ADA defines "disability" in terms that are identical to those found in
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, once again focusing on physical or
mental impairments that substantially limit a person's major life activi-
ties, records of such impairments, or whether the individual is regarded
as having such impairments. 25 In addition, under this statute, "major life
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., United States v. Happy Time Daycare Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1079-80,
1082-84 (1998) (finding sufficient evidence to classify HIV as a disability because defen-
dant's regarded minor L.W. as having a disability and because HIV-infection had substantially
limited L.W.'s major life activity of caring for himself by fighting off common infections);
Hamlyn v. Rock Island County Metro Mass Transit Dist., 986 F.Supp. 1126, 1130 (1997)
(noting that federal courts have held that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act "prohibit dis-
crimination against persons with AIDS"); see also 28 C.F.R. 36.104(l)(iii) (2010) (classifying
"HIV disease (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic) as a physical impairment" under the
ADA).
22 See, e.g., Adams v. City of Chicago, 706 F. Supp. 2d 863, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2010) ("Posi-
tive HIV status is not a 'per se disability' under the ADA, and a person who is HIV positive
must present evidence that his status impaired a major life activity.").
23 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
24 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1990).
25 Id. § 12102(1)(A)-(C).
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activities" can include "the operation of a major bodily function, includ-
ing . . . functions of the immune system [and] normal cell growth." 26
However, the problem comes when scholars and commentators-and
eventually the courts-attempt to differentiate the statute's plain lan-
guage from Congress's implicit meaning and intent. 2 7 Commentators
who champion adherence to the plain meaning of the statute cite Con-
gress's failure to explicitly list asymptomatic HIV or AIDS infection as a
disability, 28 particularly because Congress was very well aware of the
1980s AIDS epidemic at the time that it passed the statute. .29 On the
other hand, commentators who champion a more expansive interpreta-
tion of the statute focus on its legislative history, which seems to support
the implicit inclusion of HIV and AIDS sufferers under the ADA's first
prong of the disability definition. 30 Specifically, commentators often
point to statements made by Representative William Dannemeyer, Rep-
resentative Henry Waxman, and Senator William Armstrong, all of
whom classified HIV and AIDS under the ADA definition of a
disability. 31
Despite the statute's ambiguous scope, an exception exists in which
healthcare providers may refuse to offer medical services to individuals
who pose a "direct threat" to the health and safety of others. 32 The ADA
defines a "direct threat" as "a significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices,
or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids and services."33
Many commentators have used this provision, once again, to argue the
existence of Congress's implicit intent to create a broad duty to treat that
covers individuals with HIV and AIDS, suggesting that a presumptive
duty to treat exists in all situations outside of the "direct threat" excep-
tion.34 However, in order to prove that a "direct threat" exists under the
26 Id. § 12102(2)(B).
27 See Lisa Taylor Hudson, The Duty to Treat Asymptomatic HIV-Positive Patients or
Face Disability Discrimination under Abbott v. Bragdon: The Scylla and Charybdis Facing
Today's Dental and Heath Care Providers, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 665, 671-72 (1999).
28 Id. at 673 (referring to "the ADA's conspicuous silence on the inclusion of AIDS").
29 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 633.
30 Hudson, supra note 27, at 673.
31 136 CONG. REc. H4621 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer)
("The American people have no idea that with the adoption of [the ADAI we are instantane-
ously going to bring within the definition of disabled person across this land every HIV carrier
in America."); id. at H4626 (statement of Rep. Waxman) ("All such individuals [from asymp-
tomatic HIV infection, to symptomatic HIV infection] are covered under the first prong of the
definition of disability in the ADA."); id. at S9694 (July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Arm-
strong) ("the legislative history of this bill makes clear that infection with the AIDS virus-
even in the absence of any disabling symptoms-is a covered disability."); see also Brief for
Petitioner at 23 n.17, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (No. 97-156).
32 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3).
33 Id.
34 Cohen, supra note 7, at 242.
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statute, healthcare providers-often the defendants in patient discrimina-
tion actions-must show that they used reasonable judgment based upon
current medical knowledge or the best-available objective evidence to
determine that a risk to others actually existed.3 5 Much of the litigation
surrounding this provision turns on the definition of "reasonable judg-
ment," as well as who should make the determination that the patient
posed an actual, significant risk to others.36
C. Bragdon v. Abbott
On June 25, 1998, the Supreme Court broke significant ground in
favor of HIV-positive and asymptomatic AIDS sufferers. Justice Ken-
nedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, declared that plaintiff-respondent Sid-
ney Abbott's HIV-positive status was "a physical . . . impairment that
substantially limit[ed] one or more of [her] major life activities," and
thereby qualified her asymptomatic HIV infection as a disability under
the ADA. 37
In a three-step analysis, the majority first concluded that, "in light of
the immediacy with which the virus begins to damage the infected per-
son's white blood cells and the severity of the disease,... it is an impair-
ment from the moment of infection."38 Second, the majority concluded
that HIV infection affected a major life activity, namely Abbott's ability
to reproduce and bear children. 39 Finally, to satisfy the ADA's definition
of a disability, the majority concluded that the HIV infection did indeed
place substantial limitations on her ability to reproduce. 40 The majority
further supported its conclusions by examining agency interpretations is-
sued under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, administrative guidelines, and
regulations issued by the Justice Department, as well as lower court deci-
sions during the pre-ADA era.4 1
Dissenting Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas argued that de-
termining whether HIV constituted a disability should be an individual-
35 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c) (1992).
36 See, e.g., Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624, 649-50 ("[School Bd. of Nassau City v.] Arline[,
480 U.S. 273 (1987),] reserved the question whether courts should also defer to the reasonable
medical judgments of private physicians on which an employer has relied. At most, this state-
ment reserved the possibility that employers could consult with individual physicians as objec-
tive third-party experts. It did not suggest that an individual physician's state of mind could
excuse discrimination without regard to the objective reasonableness of his actions. . . . In
assessing the reasonableness of [a physician's] actions, the views of public health authorities,
such as the U.S. Public Health Service, CDC, and the National Institutes of Health, are of
special weight and authority. The views of these organizations are not conclusive, however.").
37 See id. at 631.
38 Id. at 637.
39 Id.
4o Id. at 641 ("It cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8% risk of transmitting a dread
and fatal disease to one's child does not represent a substantial limitation on reproduction.").
41 See id. at 642-47.
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ized inquiry, and concluded that Abbott failed the third prong of the
majority's analysis because she failed to prove that her HIV infection
substantially limited any of her major life activities. 4 2 Despite the fact
that the Kennedy majority concluded otherwise, the Court refused to ad-
dress the major question of whether HIV infection constituted a per se
disability under the ADA.4 3
In the wake of the decision, skeptics continue to argue that the
asymptomatic nature of the disease specifically precludes its classifica-
tion as a physical impairment under the ADA's definition of a disabil-
ity.4 They claim that HIV is not a physical impairment because the
disease does not affect the public, economic, or daily aspects of a per-
son's life, which are things Congress intended the definition of a disabil-
ity to encompass. 45 Similarly, other skeptics argue that the
asymptomatic nature of the disease and the presence of a physical im-
pairment will always be incongruous: in essence, a person with asymp-
tomatic HIV or AIDS will never be physically impaired, and therefore
precluded from disability classification, unless physical symptoms ex-
ist.4 6 Some critics also attack the classification of HIV as a disability
based on the ADA's requirement that an individual must be "regarded as
having such an impairment."47 However, the Court rebuffed all of these
arguments by declaring the use of the term "asymptomatic" to be a mis-
nomer because of the constant presence of the disease immediately upon
infection.4 8
While it seems that Bragdon represents a giant leap forward for
asymptomatic HIV and AIDS patients, and that legislators are more
likely to react rationally as public panic decreases and awareness about
the disease increases, the "newness and unfamiliarity with the unique
nature and scope of AIDS within the context of the law" continues to
present obstacles for further legal protections. 4 9 To date, the Supreme
Court has not yet explicitly addressed the issue of per se protection for
asymptomatic HIV and AIDS sufferers, which continues to place them in
a precarious position of legal ambiguity. Unfortunately, there continues
42 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 657-61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 641-42.
44 Hudson, supra note 27, at 673 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 3, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524
U.S. 624 (No. 97-156)).
45 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
46 See Hudson, supra note 27, at 673.
47 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C).
48 Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 635 ("The term [asymptomatic] is a misnomer, in some respects,
for clinical features persist throughout [this phase], including lumphadenopathy, dermatologi-
cal disorders, oral lesions, and bacterial infections. Although it varies with each individual, in
most instances this stage lasts from 7 to 11 years.").
49 See Hudson, supra note 27, at 671.
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to be some judicial hostility in lower federal courts toward ADA cover-
age of autoimmune disorders that are not yet symptomatic.5 0
II. INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HEALTH STATUS
A. Insurance Regime Overview
At its core, today's insurance regime attempts to transform so-called
unpredictable and unbudgetable events (such as illness and the accompa-
nying need for costly medical care) into predictable and budgetable
events by balancing the risks and resources of the insured population.51
In essence, health insurance allows insured individuals to pay a pre-
mium-small amounts of money over a defined period of time-in order
to have as-needed access to medical care, regardless of whether the indi-
vidual actually uses that care. 52 In return, the insured individuals have
guaranteed access to a pool of money in the event that they need medical
assistance. As a result, insurers are able to pool large amounts of money
from the aggregate of the insured population in order to cover individual
policyholders. The underlying logic of the modern insurance regime
therefore assumes that health care expenses are more predictable for ag-
gregate groups of people, and less so for individuals.53 As such, it is in
insurers' economic interest to amass large groups of "predictable," or
low-risk, individuals as their insured population in order to spread the
costs of medical care among that population's members.54
Insurers often go through a process called underwriting to determine
whether they should extend insurance coverage to an applicant and, if so,
under what terms of coverage.55 To determine the appropriate insurance
premium, insurers use either the Community Rating Model (CRM),
where "risk is divided evenly among the enrollees," or the Experience
Rating Model (ERM), where "the insurer uses prior claims experience to
predict future risk and charge enrollees accordingly." 56 Under the ERM,
50 See Bar-Tur v. Arience Capital, No. 09 Civ. 2653, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14114, at
*23-*24 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011) ("Bar-Tur has the initial burden of proving that her impair-
ment [of Common Variable Immunodeficiency, a deficiency of the immune system that
reduces that amount of antibodies a person produces] rises to the level of a disability under the
ADA... . Because Bar-Tur has offered insufficient evidence in support of her claim that she
has a substantial impairment of a major life activity, [Arience Capital's] summary judgment
motion as to her ADA discrimination claim is granted."); see also Nate Raymond, ADA
Doesn't Cover Woman's Immune Deficiency Condition, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 2011, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/nljlPubArticleNLJ.jsp?id= 1202481696336 (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
51 See LAWRENCE 0. GosmnN & PETER D. JACOBSON, LAW AND THE HEALTH SYSTEM 339
(2006).
52 Id.
53 See id.
54 See id. at 339-40.
55 Id. at 340.
56 See Gostin, supra note 51, at 340.
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insurers are better able to determine the risks of certain individuals based
on prior illnesses or medical history, ultimately allowing the insurer to
set different insurance premium rates for "high-risk" and "low-risk" pa-
tients on a seemingly case-by-case basis.57 In most cases, the individuals
that insurers deem to be too "high-risk" may be completely "priced out"
of the insurance pool when insurers set high premiums, and therefore
individuals who are unable to pay those high premiums may be denied
health insurance coverage altogether.5 8
B. Underlying Policy Rationales: Solidarity vs. Actuarial Fairness
Two distinct policy perspectives are at odds under the current insur-
ance regime. At one end of the spectrum, citizens and commentators-
and even some insurers-espouse the belief that "we should not abandon
those who are sick or attached in some way to people who are sick; sick
and healthy, we are all one community." 9 This is the solidarity princi-
ple, and it is often referred to as the mutual aid system. 6 0 Most insurers,
however, reside at the other end of the policy spectrum and adhere to the
actuarial fairness principle.6 1 Under this principle, each person must pay
for his or her own health risks respectively. 62 This notion of "distribu-
tive justice" attempts to break down the diverse, community-minded mu-
tual aid system into more fragmented and homogeneous groups, and
ultimately leads to the destruction of the mutual aid system.6 3 At the
foundation of this rationale, individuals are encouraged to think only of
themselves and those under their immediate responsibility, instead of
feeling a sense of responsibility for the community at large.6 4
C. Adverse Selection
The optimal configuration for insurance providers is for mostly low-
risk individuals to purchase health insurance. However, in practice, indi-
viduals who are "more likely to get sick and need health care are more
likely to purchase health insurance," while those who believe they are
less likely to get sick or need health insurance are less likely to purchase
health insurance coverage. 65 This phenomenon is known as adverse se-
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 287, 287-90 (1993) as reprinted in Gostin, supra note 51, at 331 (analyzing a
1991 Prudential Health Insurance advertisement).
60 See Stone, supra note 59, at 289.
61 Id. at 290 ("[I]nsurance necessarily operates on the logic of actuarial fairness when it,
in turn, is organized as a competitive market.").
62 See id. as reprinted in Gostin, supra note 51, at 332.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 Gostin, supra note 51, at 341.
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lection. Adverse selection is most likely to occur when policyholders are
in a better position than insurers to know whether they pose relatively
high or low risks: when insurers charge a uniform premium, high-risk
parties buy insurance in greater proportion than their low-risk counter-
parts.66 This process forces insurers to raise the price of coverage, which
incentivizes lower-risk parties to either forego insurance or buy less of it,
thus increasing the average level of risk among policyholders. 67 This, in
turn, causes a further rise in prices, which restarts the cycle of adverse
selection. 68 The end result of this cycle may be the complete unraveling
of the insurer's risk pool. 6 9
To combat adverse selection, insurers engage in the strategy of
favorable selection or risk shielding, in which they "seek to
keep .. . costs down by insuring only the most favorable risks."70 Most
often, these strategies include insuring large groups-such as every em-
ployee within a single company-in order to create an economically-
favorable mix of high-risk and low-risk individuals that preferably con-
tains more of the latter.71
Unfortunately, when insurance is not being purchased en masse, in-
dividual applicants seeking health insurance are often subjected to more
stringent, potentially prohibitive "entrance" requirements. 72 These re-
quirements may include mandatory physical examinations, extensive and
in-depth health history disclosure, and pre-existing condition limitations
in which the insurer may delay or refuse insurance coverage for any
health condition that was in existence before the date of application.73
Once again, particularly high-risk individuals are often "priced out"
of the health insurance application process through the imposition of
"lifetime limits on coverage, caps on specific treatments (such as AIDS),
refusal to cover preexisting mental and physical conditions, high rates,
and [being] designat[ed] as uninsurable." 74 On the rare occasion that an
insurance provider extends coverage to a high-risk individual, the insurer
often employs post-enrollment risk shielding strategies, including limits
on the amount, duration, or scope of coverage; limiting certain treat-
ments; and utilizing administrative procedures in the face of challenges
66 KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 6 (4th ed. 2005).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Gostin, supra note 51, at 341.
71 Id.
72 See Gostin, supra note 51, at 341.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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to coverage denials.75 These strategies are interdependent and are often
used in various combinations. 7 6
D. Current Federal Efforts to Regulate Health Status Insurance
Discrimination
The current state of federal law reflects a melting pot of regimes
aimed at regulating and deterring insurance discrimination based on
health status. Currently, federal law draws from civil rights, tax, and
labor laws, as well as laws that provide federal funding for state public
health activities.7 7 However, many of the current regulatory regimes are
inadequate to protect individuals infected with asymptomatic HIV and
AIDS from discriminatory insurers.7 8
1. Civil Rights Laws
Many of these regulations and laws are based upon the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,79 and are only intermittently helpful, if at all, to those in-
fected with HIV and AIDS. Title V1180 of the Act prohibits racial dis-
crimination in the context of employment and its fringe benefits, but it is
only effective against "intentional discrimination and exclusion, not the
disparate effects that stem from the facially neutral use of certain risk
classifications. 81 However, of all the regulatory regime foundations,
civil rights laws are perhaps the most effective in prohibiting discrimina-
tory insurance practices that result in racially-segregated health care, 82
simply because discrimination based on race is legally unacceptable.8 3
Unfortunately, this rationale does not take into account the reality that
race usually correlates with poorer health.84
The prohibitions against sex- and gender-based risk classifications
result in even less certainty. These legal prohibitions vary based on em-
75 Sara Rosenbaum, Insurance Discrimination on the Basis of Health Status: An Over-
view of Discrimination Practices, Federal Law, and Federal Reform Options, 37 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 103, 107-08 (2009).
76 See id. at 108.
77 Id. at 108.
78 Id.
79 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6).
80 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e -2000e-17 (1964).
81 Rosenbaum, supra note 75, at 108.
82 See id. (citing Linton v. Carney, 779 F. Supp. 925, 932 (M.D. Tenn. 1990)).
83 42 U.S.C §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (1964).
84 See Francis S. Collins, What We Do and Don't Know About "Race," "Ethnicity,"
Genetics and Health at the Dawn of the Genome Era, 36 NATURE GENETICS S 13, S 14 (2004)
("'Race' and 'ethnicity' are poorly defined terms that serve as flawed surrogates for multiple
environmental and genetic factors in disease causation, including ancestral geographic origins,
socioeconomic status, education and access to healthcare.").
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ployment status as well as across state and federal laws.85 Prohibitions
against age-based risk classifications are even less certain, to the point
that the federal government explicitly authorizes discriminatory practices
based on these classifications. For example, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 6 explicitly allows employers to give
older workers fewer benefits, such as providing fewer benefits to Medi-
care-age employees.87
2. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Once again, the ADA offers limited protection, precisely because
the narrow definition of a disabled person does not always include those
infected with asymptomatic HIV and AIDS.8 8 Simply being in poor
health does not automatically ensure that an individual will receive disa-
bility-based protections.89 Moreover, the ADA further discourages ap-
plicants by doing little or nothing to regulate the content provisions of
insurance plans. 90 Instead, "private health insurers can single out certain
conditions (e.g., HIV/AIDS) for complete or near-total coverage exclu-
sion, so long as the exclusion applies to all plan members."91
3. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA)92
This Act-based in tax law and with regulatory power over certain
retirement, health, and welfare benefit plans-establishes certain mini-
mum standards for the employers who chose to provide health insurance
en masse to their employees.93 The statute extends protection beyond
that of the ADA by focusing "on health status rather than disability." 94
However, the statute does not reach far enough to address the content of
health insurance plans, which is often where insurers do much of their
post-enrollment discriminating.95 Instead, HIPAA prohibits insurers
from considering health status when assessing an individual's initial ac-
cess to insurance. 96 Specifically, the statute prevents those who issue
85 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (1964).
86 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
87 See Rosenbaum, supra note 75, at 108.
88 Id. at 108-09.
89 Id. at 109 ("Poor health status alone is not enough to trigger disability protections.").
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 193 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg and 29 U.S.C § 1181 and 42
U.S.C. 1320d).
93 See Rosenbaum, supra note 75, at 109.
94 Id.
95 See id. at 107-08, 109.
96 Id. at 110-11.
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state-regulated group health insurance from considering health status
with regard to "enrollment, date of effective coverage, waiting periods,
late and special enrollment rules, eligibility for benefit packages, bene-
fits[,] . . . continued eligibility, and coverage termination."9 7
Moreover, while there are certain prohibitions that limit insurers
from excluding those with pre-existing conditions under HIPAA, 9 8 pre-
existing physical conditions are defined narrowly as those "for which
medical advice was recommended or received within a six month period
ending on the enrollment date."99 Even in the attempt to expand the
legal prohibitions on health status discrimination, this definition often
precludes asymptomatic HIV and AIDS from classification as a pre-ex-
isting condition because few of those infected have received medical
treatment within six months of their enrollment.100
E. Proposed Legal Solutions
At this point, one thing is clear: the lackluster framework of the
modem health insurance system, as well as the inadequate protections of
the legal regime, are in desperate need of change if they are ever to ade-
quately serve the aggregate of the HIV- and AIDS-infected population.
Once again, at its core, the underlying risk-averse rationale of the insur-
ance regime seeks to balance the "high-risk" individuals against the "low
risk" individuals, in an effort to eliminate large economic expenditures.
In a sense, insurers seek to keep their costs down by insuring the largest
number of low-risk individuals possible.101
In an attempt to address this legal donut hole, scholars and insur-
ance providers alike have presented a number of insurance reform op-
tions in order to balance the low-risk enrollee demand of the insurance
industry against the insurance needs of high-risk individuals.
1. Nationwide Group Purchasing
For most high-risk individuals who attempt to purchase insurance
on their own, the major problem remains that they are not part of a larger
pool-such as a group of employees-to offset their poor health condi-
tions. 102 One way to combat this issue is to mandate a national group
purchasing plan-creating a national pool of insured individuals, in
97 Id. at I 10.
98 Rosenbaum, supra note 75, at I 10.
99 Id.
100 See generally id. at 113 ("[L]aws aimed at ensuring guaranteed entry into coverage
arrangements contain numerous limitations and loopholes, such as non-discrimination on the
basis of pre-existing conditions that restricts its reach to persons who have not recently been in
treatment (within 6 months). . . .").
lot See Gostin, supra note 51, at 341.
102 See Rosenbaum, supra note 75, at 113.
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which the majority of low-risk individuals throughout the entire country
offset the minority of high-risk individuals. However, instilling a sense
of solidarity in such an amorphous and diverse group-particularly one
governed by the actuarial fairness regime for so long-would be difficult
to implement in practice. Compulsory enrollment in a national health
insurance pool, as well as automatic enrollment with opt-out provisions,
would be absolutely necessary in order to ensure the creation of the pool
of sufficient size in order to combat the issue of adverse selection that
currently pervades the insurance regime. 103
Responses to such a solution have been mixed.10 While this solu-
tion would provide a sort of "safety net" to employers and individuals
alike to ensure that individuals have adequate health coverage no matter
what, the institution of a national pool would likely result in the elimina-
tion of the individual health insurance market.105 In theory, this solution
would provide a system of health insurance coverage for every Ameri-
can,106 including those infected with HIV and AIDS, who are often actu-
ally or constructively denied coverage based on their "high-risk" health
status.
2. Minimum Participation and Non-Discrimination Standards
An alternative solution to address the coverage gaps in health insur-
ance would be to require current insurance providers to meet minimum
standards, which could be modeled after the standards in nationally-rec-
ognized "benchmark" insurance plans such as the Federal Employee
Health Benefit Plan.10 7 These minimum standards, such as pregnancy
non-discrimination, coverage of mothers and newborns, and mental
health parity, could apply to every health insurance plan and could be
easily regulated. 0 8
Insurance providers might also be required to institute "exception"
systems within the insurance coverage regime. These systems, such as
the one found in the Medicare Part D prescription plan,' 0 9 would allow
insurance coverage for medical treatments beyond the scope of the basic
plan ("extra-contractual treatments")." 10 This system would be achieved
103 Id. at 113-14.
104 See id. at 114.
105 Id. at 114.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See id.
109 See, e.g., CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION
DRUG COVERAGE: How To REQUEST A COVERAGE DETERMINATION, FILE AN APPEAL, OR FILE
A COMPLAINT 2-3 (2009), http://www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/l I 12.pdf (giving
an overview of the exception process for a recipient to appeal Medicare's refusal to cover non-
formulary drugs).
110 Rosenbaum, supra note 75, at 115.
STIGMATIZED SILENCE
by instituting a neutral Board, likely composed of specially appointed
healthcare professionals, to determine whether an "extra-contractual" or
"high-risk" treatment is indeed necessary for the individual patient. II
The underlying rationale for such a system has also shown up in Con-
gress's so-called "patients' bill of rights" legislation.xI 2 In keeping with
this approach, other measures of reform have included the institution of
risk-adjusted payment methodologies, in which insurance provider
payouts would increase or decrease based on the level of care or treat-
ment needed by individual policyholders.1 1 3
III. "OBAMACARE" EXAMINED
At this point, the Obama Administration has achieved one of its
major goals of passing healthcare reform legislation. 114 On March 23,
2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (PPACA) into law,115 followed closely by the passage of the
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA) on March 30,
2010 to amend certain provisions in the PPACA. 116 However, in the
shadow of these laws, the question remains: where do asymptomatic HIV
and AIDS sufferers fit in?
A. Amending the Existing Public Health Service Act
A scattered series of provisions throughout the PPACA make sev-
eral amendments to the Public Health Service Act,117 enacted by Con-
gress in 1944 to consolidate and revise all existing legislation related to
the nation's Public Health Service. The PPACA makes the multiple
changes to the Public Health Service Act, including the elimination of
lifetime or annual coverage limits, establishing a prohibition on rescis-
sions, the establishment of an appeals process, and a provision that elimi-
nates discrimination based on health status.
Ill See id. at 114.
112 See, e.g., Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong. § 1(a), 103-04
(2001).
113 Rosenbaum, supra note 75, at 115.
114 E.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill,
With a Flourish, N.Y. TiWs, Mar. 23, 2010, at A19 (as corrected on March 25, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html.
115 Id.
116 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029.
117 42 U.S.C. § 300gg et seq. (2010).
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1. Elimination of Lifetime or Annual Coverage Limits" 8
The PPACA prohibits insurance companies from establishing dollar
limits on the total lifetime amount that an insurance company will pay
for covered benefits to the insured or to the insured's beneficiaries.1 9 In
addition, the PPACA precludes insurers from setting "unreasonable" an-
nual limits on covered benefits, 120 and precludes insurers from setting
unreasonable deductible amounts.121 The unreasonableness of the de-
ductible is specifically defined by the Internal Revenue Code which es-
tablishes a deductible range of $1,000 to $5,000 for individual self-
coverage and $2,000 to $10,000 for families.122
2. Prohibition on Rescissions1 23
The PPACA seeks to ensure the guaranteed renewability of individ-
ual and group health insurance coverage.124 Once individuals are in-
sured, insurers can only rescind that coverage when there is clear and
convincing evidence of insurance fraud on the part of the insured. 125
3. Establishment of an Appeals Process' 26
The PPACA requires every insurer to implement a process whereby
individuals can dispute coverage determinations and claims.127 As part
of the process, insured individuals must have culturally- and linguisti-
cally-appropriate notice that the appeals process exists, the ability to re-
view their file, and the option of an external review process that ensures
adequate consumer protections.1 28
4. Prevent Discrimination Based on Health Status
The PPACA inserts a section into the Public Health Service Act that
precludes insurance companies from implementing coverage restrictions
or establishing excessive premiums on individuals.129 As a result, an
insurance provider cannot exclude an individual or restrict insurance
coverage based on certain delineated factors, including health status,
118 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1001 (2010) (amending the
Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2711).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(1).
122 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2010).
123 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12 (2010).
124 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 2 (2010).
125 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 2 (2010).
126 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19 (2010).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2010).
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physical and mental medical conditions, claims experience, receipt of
healthcare, medical history, genetic information, evidence of insurability,
disability, and any other health-status related factor determined appropri-
ate by the Secretary of Health to determine insurance eligibility. 13 0
However, like its statutory predecessors, the law does not clearly define
the term "disability."
B. Expanding Health Insurance Coverage
Beyond amendments to the existing Public Health Service Act, the
bulk of the PPACA takes on the arduous task of expanding the previ-
ously existing health insurance coverage regime.13' Provisions of the
PPACA that have the potential to apply to asymptomatic HIV and AIDS
sufferers include the creation of a national high risk pool program, the
prohibition of exclusion based on preexisting conditions, and the estab-
lishment of an essential benefits package.
1. National High Risk Pool Program
No later than ninety days after the PPACA's enactment, the Secre-
tary of Health must establish a temporary high-risk pool insurance pro-
gram that will provide insurance coverage to eligible individuals until
January 1, 2014, when many of the permanent provisions of the Health
Care Exchange take effect.13 2 The Secretary can establish this temporary
insurance pool by contracting independently and directly with eligible
insurance providers.133 The program is only open to (1) citizens and
those who are lawfully present in the United States, (2) individuals not
covered under creditable coverage, and (3) individuals who have a preex-
isting condition. 34
2. Prevent Exclusion Based on Preexisting Conditions
While there are independent criteria that insurers must meet in order
to qualify to enter into a contract with the Secretary, there are other re-
quirements for the acceptability of the temporary high-risk insurance
pool-including preclusion against preexisting condition restrictions. 35
Once again, one criterion for individuals to be eligible for the temporary
pool is the presence of a preexisting condition, as determined "in a man-
ner consistent with guidance issued by" the Secretary of Health.136
130 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2010).
131 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. II 1-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
t32 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a).
133 42 U.S.C. § 18001(b)(1).
134 42 U.S.C. § 18001(d)(1)-(3).
135 42 U.S.C. § 18001(c)(2)(A).
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 18001(d)(3).
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The Secretary of Health must also take on a policing and over-
sight137 role by establishing criteria to determine if "insurance issuers
and employment-based health plans have discouraged an individual from
remaining enrolled in prior coverage based on that individual's health
status."138 If an insurer engages in such prohibited risk-dumping activ-
ity, that insurer must reimburse the program for the medical expenses of
the individual who was encouraged to disenroll in the insurance plan.139
3. Establishment of Essential Benefits
Finally, the PPACA makes significant strides toward the protection
of asymptomatic HIV and AIDS sufferers by requiring the Secretary to
define the minimum level of care that insurance companies must provide
for their insured members.140 The law refers to such standards as the
"essential benefits package," and at a minimum explicitly includes ambu-
latory patient services, emergency services, hospitalization benefits and
maternity and newborn care, as well as mental health and substance
abuse disorder services, prescription drug services, rehabilitative ser-
vices, laboratory services, specific preventative services, and oral and vi-
sion pediatric services.141
When determining the scope of the "essential benefits," the Secre-
tary must ensure the essential health benefits are equal to the benefits
provided under a typical employer plan.14 2 In making this determination,
the Secretary may not make any "coverage decisions, determine reim-
bursement rates, establish incentive programs, or design benefits in ways
that discriminate against individuals based on their age, disability, or ex-
pected length of life."' 43
The PPACA also establishes various levels of insurance that will be
available to Americans, ranging from Bronze (the lowest coverage level)
to Platinum (the highest coverage level).144 The Bronze, Silver, Gold,
and Platinum coverage levels provide 60, 70, 80, and 90% of the actua-
rial value of benefits, respectively. 145
137 See 42 U.S.C. § 18001(f).
138 42 U.S.C. § 18001(e)(1).
139 See 42 U.S.C. § 18001(e)(2).
140 See 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2010).
141 See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(A)-(J).
142 See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(2)(A).
143 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(B).
144 See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1).
145 See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1)(A)-(D).
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CONCLUSION
While the "Obamacare" plan is, no doubt, one of the most signifi-
cant pieces of social legislation since the Social Security Act,14 6 PPACA
has the same substantive ambiguities that plague its statutory predeces-
sors. To be fair, the statutory language goes to pain-staking lengths to
prohibit health status-based insurance discrimination and exclusion based
on preexisting conditions. 14 7 However, the law once again fails to ad-
dress asymptomatic HIV and AIDS infection as a significant source of
insurance discrimination. Even if asymptomatic HIV and AIDS infec-
tion represents a minute subset of the "health status" category that is
more likely to be addressed in the later regulations accompanying the
law, lawmakers still had an opportunity to include HIV and AIDS as a
part of the reform discussion, and they failed to take advantage of it.
Currently, any legal protections for asymptomatic HIV and AIDS
sufferers that might arise out of PPACA hang in a precarious balance,
based solely on the discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. As a result, much of the responsibility to fill the substantive
void and statutory ambiguity will fall on the Secretary's shoulders. Ex-
tensive regulations and exhaustingly comprehensive definitional sections
will be essential in this effort, and in ensuring that the law covers all of
the groups-including asymptomatic HIV and AIDS sufferers-that
have consistently been "priced out" and excluded from health insurance
coverage.
Based on the text of the statute, the two crucial areas where the
Secretary can make the greatest strides for individuals with asymptom-
atic HIV and AIDS are in (1) the amendments to the Public Health Act
that prohibit discrimination based on health status (as defined by the Sec-
retary)148 and (2) the process to define the benefits that make up the
essential benefits package.14 9 In the battle against health insurance dis-
crimination, "health status" seems like the term that will be easiest to
construe as inclusive of asymptomatic HIV and AIDS. However, in
promulgating regulatory guidelines or definitions, the Secretary will need
to refer explicitly to HIV/AIDS infection as a qualifying health status
factor or a preexisting condition in order to avoid the same litigation
battles that have plagued the debate between plain meaning and Congres-
sional intent. Unfortunately, the fact that Congress did not address or
discuss the issue during the legislative process makes it more difficult to
146 See Alan Silverleib, Senate Approves Health Care Reform Bill, CNN, (Dec. 24, 2009,
1:01 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/24/health.care/index.html.
147 See 42 U.S.C. § 18001(c)(2)(A).
148 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4.
149 See 42 U.S.C. § 18022.
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advance the argument that Congress intended HIV/AIDS to be a preex-
isting condition, much less a disability.
To its credit, PPACA incorporates all of the insurance reform sug-
gestions championed by commentators.15 0 The law refers to a single risk
pool that insurance companies must consider when extending coverage
to applicants. PPACA also incorporates benchmark insurance plans on
which to model the new insurance coverage regime, and the statute cre-
ates the essential health benefits package that outlines the minimum stan-
dard of coverage that insurance providers must meet. Overall, however,
the incorporation of these elements has done little to champion the cause
of asymptomatic HIV and AIDS sufferers. "Obamacare," despite the
overall healthcare significance of its reformative effort, continues to fos-
ter the same legislative ambiguity and silence that has left HIV and AIDS
sufferers as a legally invisible class.
150 See discussion supra Part H.E. .
